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Under European Union law, possession of a nationality is a 
prerequisite for European Union citizenship. Member States of the 
European Union are free to determine the persons who it considers to be 
its nationals. As a result, there are inconsistencies among Member 
States, specifically regarding whether a child born in the country can 
obtain citizenship if the child would otherwise become stateless, if 
citizenship is not provided. Article fifteen of The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights states that everyone has the right to a nationality. 
However, statelessness remains a problem, particularly among children. 
Current European Union law does not provide for the protection of 
children who would be considered “stateless” upon birth. This article 
examines whether the concept of European Union citizenship should be 
expanded to include children who would become stateless upon birth in 
Member States.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Article 15 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“1. [e]veryone has the right to a nationality” and that “2. [n]o one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality.”1 However, statelessness remains a problem, particularly 
among children, who inherit statelessness from their parents who were 
stateless before them or are the “unsuspecting victims of a gap or conflict 
in nationality laws.”2 Statelessness means “a person who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”3
Statelessness obstructs the rights conferred upon citizens of a nation, 
such as the right to “education, health, work, family life, and free 
movement.”4 Citizenship is the “right to have rights.”5 Without 
citizenship, one lacks social, economic, and political rights; on a 
symbolic level, one lacks the right to identify and become a full member 
of a national community.6
There are over ten million people worldwide who are stateless, 
including hundreds of thousands in Europe who do not hold the 
 1. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 
1948).
 2. None of Europe’s Children Should be Stateless, EUR. NETWORK ON 
STATELESSNESS, http://www.statelessness.eu/communications/campaigns/none-europes-
children-should-be-stateless (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).  
 3. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, opened for 
signature Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960). 
 4. Addressing the Human Rights Impact of Statelessness in the EU’S External 
Action, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 534.983, 8 (2014).  
 5. Nils Muižnieks, Governments Should Act in the Best Interest of Stateless 
Children, COUNCIL EUR. (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-
/governments-should-act-in-the-best-interest-of-stateless-childr-1.  
 6. Id.
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citizenship of any state.7 Member States of the European Union are free 
to determine the persons who it considers to be its nationals. As a result, 
there are inconsistencies among Member States, specifically regarding 
whether a child born in the country can obtain citizenship if the child 
would otherwise become stateless, if citizenship were not provided. 
More particularly, “[i]ndividual membership of the European Union is 
unlike traditional models of citizenship,” since “[i]ts nature is 
complementary.8 In other words, the nationality of one of the twenty-
eight Member States is currently a prerequisite to obtaining European 
Union citizenship.9 As a result, children born in states, which do not 
provide for citizenship rights for children who would otherwise become 
stateless, have no recourse under European Union law. Therefore, the 
European Union should amend the concept of European Union 
citizenship in order to provide protection for children who would 
otherwise become stateless upon birth.  
The European Court of Justice has contributed to the further 
consolidation of the scope and content of European Union citizenship 
and has addressed questions regarding the rights of third-country 
nationals in the territory of the European Union.10 Advocate General 
Sharpston poses the following question regarding European Union 
citizenship in her Opinion of Case C-34/09 Zambrano v. Office national 
de l’emploi ,11
[i]s the exercise of rights as a Union citizen dependent – like the 
exercise of the classic economic ‘freedoms’ – on some trans-frontier 
free movement (however accidental, peripheral or remote) having taken 
place before the claim is advanced? Or does Union citizenship look 
forward to the future, rather than back to the past, to define the rights 
 7. Id.; see also EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS, PREVENTING 
CHILDHOOD STATELESSNESS IN EUROPE: ISSUES, GAPS, AND GOOD PRACTICES 2 (2014). 
 8. Severine Picard, The EU Constitutional Treaty: Towards a European 
Citizenship for Third-country nationals? 1 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 73, 73 (2005). 
 9. Id.
 10. Ineta Ziemele, Nationality and Third-Country Nationals, in THE COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY
YEARS OF CASE-LAW 471, 472 (Allan Rosas et al. eds., 2013). 
 11. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-01177. 
308 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.2
and obligations that it confers? To put the same question from a slightly 
different angle: is Union citizenship merely the non-economic version 
of the same generic kind of free movement rights as have long existed 
for the economically active and for persons of independent means? Or 
does it mean something more radical: true citizenship, carrying with it a 
uniform set of rights and obligations, in a Union under the rule of law 
in which respect for fundamental rights must necessarily play an 
integral part?12
This article will analyze whether the concept of European Union 
citizenship should be expanded to include children who would become 
stateless upon birth in Member States. Part I will address the emergence 
of the principle of European Union citizenship. Part II will examine the 
relevant cases that have come before the European Court of Justice. 
Finally, Part III will evaluate whether stateless children should be 
brought under the scope of European Union citizenship or if acquiring 
citizenship upon birth should remain solely within the purview of the 
Member States.  
PART I. BACKGROUND: THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF 
“EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP” AND DERIVATIVE RIGHTS FOR THIRD-
COUNTRY NATIONALS
Citizenship remains a complex legal notion and social phenomenon.13
Citizenship has been defined as “reciprocity of rights and duties [to the 
State].”14 At the heart of citizenship is the feeling of belonging. In Kaur,
the European Court of Justice stated that under international law it is up 
to each Member State, “having due regard to [Union] law, to lay down 
the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.”15 Member 
States and not the European Union were considered the gatekeepers to 
European Union citizenship, since Member State nationality is a 
 12. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-01177, ¶ 
3.
 13. Ziemele, supra note 10, at 472.  
 14. Id. 
 15. CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS 476 (4th ed., 2013).
2017] European Citizenship for Stateless Children 309
precondition to Union citizenship.16 Originally, the line between 
European Union law and national law was more clear-cut, and the 
category of persons covered by European Union law was limited to those 
participating in the development of the internal market, i.e. workers.17
However, with the entrance into force of Maastricht, this line was 
blurred. Therefore, it is important to consider, where does the European 
Union stand when it comes to citizenship?18 The desire to create a 
“Europe for Citizens” or a “People’s Europe” dates back to the 1970s; 
however, it was not until Spain pressed the issue at Maastricht that the 
European citizen concept took shape.19
A. Maastricht Treaty of 1993 
Part Two of the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established the “Citizens of 
the Union” concept and laid down the specific rights that the “European 
citizen” could enjoy.20 Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty states that  
“[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union.”21 Moreover, Article 8(a) established the right of 
every citizen of the European Union to “move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States.”22 Article 8(b)(2) provided the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament 
in the Member State in which he resides,23 Article 8(c) provided for the 
protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member 
States, when a citizen of the Union is in the territory of a third country,24
and Article 8(d) provided for the right to petition of the European 
Parliament and the ability to apply to the Ombudsman.25 The Maastricht 
 16. See id. at 438. 
 17. Erik Kotlárik, The EU Citizenship in Purely Internal Situations and Reverse 
Discrimination, CENT. EUR. U. 1, 2 (2013). 
 18. BARNARD, supra note 15, at 433.
 19. Id. at 432.  
 20. Id.
 21. Treaty on European Union art. 8, Feb. 7 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. 
 22. Id. at art. 8(a). 
 23. Id. at art. 8(b)(2).  
 24. Id. at art. 8(c).  
 25. Id. at art. 8(d).  
310 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.2
Treaty also recognized the fundamental role of individuals in the newly 
created Union, regardless of whether they were economically active.26
In Gryzelczk, the European Court of Justice went further and stated 
“the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights… and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.”27 Moreover, the Court held that the “Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the 
same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such 
exception as are expressly provided for.”28
B. Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, further 
expanded the concept of European citizenship.29 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced current Article 3(2) of the Treaty of the European 
Union, which states that “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free 
movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration 
and the prevention and combating of crime.”30 As a result, the Treaty 
“communautarised migration-related issues” and gave European Union 
institutions the competence to define “conditions of entry and residence, 
including long-term residence permits, and the rights and conditions 
under which nationals of third countries,” who were legal residents in 
one Member State could reside in another Member State.31
 26. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-01177, ¶ 
67.
 27. Id. ¶ 68. 
 28. Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-06193, R.  ; see also BARNARD, supra note 15, at 437.  
 29. BARNARD, supra note 15, at 432. 
 30. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union art. 3(2), Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
 31. Picard, supra note 8, at 74 stating “[r]ecent years have seen progress in terms 
of political will. In 1999, the Tampere European Council concluded that the status of long 
term resident third-country nationals should be approximated to the status of member 
states’ nationals i.e. with a set of similar rights. In June 2002, the Seville European 
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C. Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon further cemented the 
notion of European Union citizenship, particularly in Articles 20 and 21 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 20 states 
that:
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace 
national citizenship. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the 
duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: 
(a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States; 
(b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the 
European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State 
of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; 
(c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the 
protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member 
State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State; 
(d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the 
European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory 
bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a 
reply in the same language. 
Council further acknowledged the importance of the contribution by third country 
nationals to economic, social and cultural life.” 
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These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and 
limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted 
thereunder.32
However, the rights listed in Article 20(2) are not exhaustive. In other 
words, citizens also enjoy rights found in Article 18 TFEU, the right to 
non-discrimination on the ground of nationality.33 Moreover, the 
European Court of Justice has also taken into account the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in order to strike down 
legislation that violates a fundamental right.34 The notion of European 
citizenship is also important because [w]hen the ties of identity with a 
single State are broken so that they may be shared with others, a 
connection is woven in a wider sphere.”35
Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
states that:  
1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the 
measures adopted to give them effect. 
2. If action by the Union should prove necessary to attain this 
objective and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt provisions with a view to 
facilitating the exercise of the rights referred to in paragraph 1. 
3. For the same purposes as those referred to in paragraph 1 and if the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt measures 
 32. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 20, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/47) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 33. BARNARD, supra note 15, at 437.  
 34. Id. at 435.  
 35. Catherine Barnard, Citizenship of the Union and the Area of Justice: 
(Almost) The Court’s Moment of Glory, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW 
505, 520 (Allan Rosas et al. eds., 2013). 
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concerning social security or social protection. The Council shall act 
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.36
Article 21 is considered the primary right of European citizenship, 
freedom of movement. In Baumbast, the European Court of Justice 
severed the link between migration and having to be economically active 
by stating that “the Treaty on European Union does not require that 
citizens of the Union pursue a profession or trade activity, whether as an 
employed or self-employed person, in order to enjoy the rights provided 
in Part Two [TFEU], on citizenship of the Union.”37
D. Directive 2004/38 
With the introduction of European Union citizenship under the 
Maastricht Treaty, also came an extension of the scope of application of 
family reunification rights to Member State nationals who were not 
engaged in economic activity. Nationals of Member States could rely on 
their European Union citizenship rights, including a right of residence for 
third-country family members, when the issue falls under the scope of 
European Union law.38 However, if the situation did not have a link with 
European Union law, it would be subject to the more restrictive national 
rules on reunification of the Member States.39 Directive 2004/38 
specifically deals with the rights enjoyed by “citizens of the Union and 
their family members,”40 and applies to citizens as defined under Article 
20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.41 Article 2 
and Article 3 of the Directive must be taken into consideration when 
determining whether rights can be allocated to a European Union 
citizen’s family members. Article 2 defines who is considered a “Union 
citizen” and a “Family member” under the Directive:42
 36. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 32, at art. 21. 
 37. BARNARD, supra note 15, at 330. .
 38. Peter Van Elsuwege & Dimitry Kochenov, On the Limits of Judicial 
Intervention: EU Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights, 13 EUR. J. MIGRATION &
L. 443, 443 (2011).  
 39. Id.
 40. BARNARD, supra note 15, at 437.  
 41. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 32, at art. 20. 
 42. Council Directive 2004/38, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC).  
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For the purposes of this Directive: 
1)“Union citizen” means any person having the nationality of a 
Member State;  
2)”Family member” means:  
(a) the spouse;  
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a 
registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member 
State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered 
partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member 
State;
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are 
[dependents] and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b);  
(d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the 
spouse or partner as defined in point (b);43
and Article 3 on Beneficiaries states that:  
1. This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who move to or 
reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national, 
and to their family members as defined in point 2 of Article 2 who 
accompany or join them.  
2. Without prejudice to any right to free movement and residence the 
persons concerned may have in their own right, the host Member State 
shall, in accordance with its national legislation, facilitate entry and 
residence for the following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not 
falling under the definition in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country 
from which they have come, are dependents or members of the 
household of the Union citizen having the primary right of residence, 
 43. Id. at art. 2.  
2017] European Citizenship for Stateless Children 315
or where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of 
the family member by the Union citizen;  
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, 
duly attested.  
The host Member State shall undertake an extensive examination of the 
personal circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or 
residence to these people.44
The Directive also lays down the conditions that must be satisfied 
before European Union citizens or their family members can acquire the 
right of residence in a Member State for longer than three months.45 In 
order for a family member to obtain a right of residence for more than 
three months, the citizen “must either be a worker or employed person in 
the host Member State or ‘have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State.’”46
The European Court of Justice has helped clarify not only who is 
considered a European Union citizen but also when third-country 
national family members can derive rights under Directive 2004/38. 
Moreover, given that European citizenship is a “transnational polity,” 
should European Union citizenship aim to replicate citizenship of a 
nation state (so that European Union citizenship means citizen of a 
European Union nation state)?47 If so, can the notion of European Union 
citizen be expanded to include children who are born in Member States 
and who could potentially end up being stateless?48
 44. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 42, at art. 3. 
 45. Id. at art. 6. 
 46. Tom Richards, Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci: Reading the Leaves of EU 
Citizenship Jurisprudence, 17 JUD. REV. 272, 275 (2012). 
 47. Van Elsuwege & Kochenov, supra note 38, at 444.  
 48. BARNARD, supra note 15, at 432. 
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PART II: EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE CASE LAW ON UNION
CITIZENSHIP AND THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS 
The case law of the European Court of Justice on European 
citizenship is complex, rapidly evolving, and often highly technical. Part 
II will address the evolution of the notion of the European Union citizen, 
citizen rights, and rights conferred on third-country nationals, under 
European Court of Justice case law. The freedom of movement of 
individuals under European Union law was originally a right restricted to 
those who were economically active.49 However, with the entrance into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the concept of the European 
Union citizenship extended the right of freedom of movement to all 
citizens, regardless of whether they were economically active.50
Moreover, the question of whether residence rights can be extended to 
third-country nationals, through European Union citizens has been under 
scrutiny for some time. Rights have been extended to third-country 
national parents via children holding European Union citizenship, even 
in a situation where “intra-Union mobility was not exercised.”51 The 
European Court of Justice has relied on Article 20 TFEU to derive the 
right of residence for third-country national parents of European Union 
citizens, as seen in Chen.52 The following cases will be discussed in this 
section: Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern,
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi, Shirley McCarthy 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, and Murat Dereci and 
Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres.
A. Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department 
The parties in Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department sought to ascertain whether 
 49. Richards, supra note 46, at 272.  
 50. Id. at 273.  
 51. Id.
 52. Sonia Morano-Foadi, Un-Nesting the “Matrioska” Doll: Problems and 
Paradoxes at the Intersection Between Citizenship, Migration and Human Rights, 27–28
REVISTA DE DERECHO DE LA UNION EUROPEA 301, 309 (2014). 
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Directive 73148, Directive 90/364 or Article 18 EC, read in conjunction 
with Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms, conferred upon a young 
minor, who is a national of a Member State and in the care of a parent 
who is a third-country national, the right to reside in another Member 
State, where the minor receives childcare services.53 If so, do these 
provisions confer a right of residence on the parent?54 Mrs. Chen moved 
to Northern Ireland with the intention of having her child acquire the 
nationality of another Member State.55 Mrs. Chen worked with her 
husband for a company registered in China.56 The company exported 
chemicals to various parts of the world, including the United Kingdom 
and other European Union Member States.57
Mr. Chen was one of the directors of the company, and as a result, 
travelled frequently to the United Kingdom.58 Despite the one child 
policy adopted by China, Mr. and Mrs. Chen decided to have a second 
child.59 As a result, Mrs. Chen decided to give birth to her child abroad in 
order to avoid any repercussions that may befall her family as a result of 
China’s “one child policy.”60 Therefore, they decided to take advantage 
of Ireland’s law, which granted jus soli citizenship – i.e. nationality to 
anyone born in Ireland.61 Catherine was born on September 16, 2000, in 
Belfast, Northern Ireland.62 Mr. and Mrs. Chen had specifically chosen 
Belfast because they wanted to take advantage of the European citizens 
right that would be conferred upon Catherine, upon her birth, namely the 
right to establish themselves in the United Kingdom.63 Although 
Catherine gained Irish nationality, she did not acquire United Kingdom 
 53. Case C-200/02, Zhu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2005 E.C.R. 1-
9951, ¶ 16.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. ¶ 34. 
 56. Id. ¶ 8. 
 57. Id. ¶ 8. 
 58. Id. ¶ 9. 
 59. Id. ¶ 10. 
 60. Id. ¶ 11. 
 61. David H. King, Chen v. Secretary of State: Expanding the Residency Rights 
of Non-Nationals in the European Community, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 
293—94 (2007).  
 62. Zhu, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925, ¶ 12.  
 63. Id. ¶ 13. 
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nationality because she did not meet the requirements laid down by UK 
law.64 As a result, Mrs. Chen applied to the UK for a permit that would 
allow her and Catherine to reside in the UK.65 However, the Secretary of 
State rejected the applications.66 It is also important to note that Mrs. 
Chen was economically self-sufficient and could provide for Catherine.67
The United Kingdom and Ireland claimed that the benefit on free 
movement of persons and residence could not apply to a person in 
Catherine’s position since she had never moved from one Member State 
to another Member State.68 The United Kingdom also argued that the 
Chen’s were not entitled to rely on the Community provisions, since they 
attempted to exploit Community law by giving birth “in a part of the host 
Member State to which another Member State applies its rules governing 
acquisition of nationality jure soli.”69 Moreover, the United Kingdom 
argued that Member States should have the ability to implement 
measures in order to prevent individuals from improperly taking 
advantage of Community law.70
The Court began by stating that a situation cannot be made purely 
internal just because a national of a Member State, who was born in the 
host Member State, has not made use of the right to freedom of 
movement.71 This would deprive the national of the provisions of 
Community law.72 Moreover, regarding the right to reside in the territory 
of the Member States provided for in current Article 21(1) TFEU, the 
right is granted directly to every citizen of the Union, purely as a national 
of a Member State, and therefore as a citizen of the Union.73 Therefore, 
Catherine was entitled to rely on Article 21(1).74 However, the right of 
citizens of the Union to reside in another Member State is recognized 
subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the Treaty and by 
 64. Id. ¶ 14. 
 65. Zhu, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9951, ¶ 12.  
 66. Id. ¶ 14. 
 67. See id. ¶ 13. 
 68. Id. ¶ 26. 
 69. Id. ¶ 34. 
 70. See id. ¶ 30. 
 71. Id. ¶ 19. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.  
 73. Id.
 74. Id. ¶ 26. 
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the measures adopted to give it affect.75 While Mrs. Chen admitted that 
the purpose of her stay in the United Kingdom was to create a situation 
where her child could acquire the nationality of another Member State, 
so that she and her child could secure a long-term right to reside in the 
United Kingdom, the Court held that it is for each Member State, having 
“due regard” of Community law, to lay down the conditions for the 
acquisition and loss of nationality.76
The Court also stated that Member States could not impose additional 
conditions for recognition of the nationality granted by another Member 
State.77 Finally, the Court held that “a young minor who is a national of a 
Member State, is covered by the appropriate sickness insurance and is in 
the care of a parent who is a third-country national having sufficient 
resources for that minor not to become a burden on the public finances of 
the host Member State, a right to reside for an indefinite period in that 
State.”78 Moreover, Article 21 TFEU and Council Directive 9-/364/EEC 
allows a “parent who is that minor’s primary care [provider] to reside 
with the child in the host Member State.”79
B. Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern 
Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern helped flesh out other features of 
European Union citizenship. Rottmann concerned the interpretation of 
the citizenship provisions of the European Community Treaty.80 The 
question referred for preliminary ruling was whether, 
it is contrary to European Union law, in particular to Article 17 EC, for 
a Member State to withdraw from a citizen of the Union the nationality 
 75. Id.
 76. Id. ¶¶ 36–37.  
 77. Id. ¶ 39. 
 78. Id. ¶ 47; see also Id. ¶ 47; Zhu, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925, ¶¶ 53, 55 stating (“there 
is no doubt that minors can be vested with residence rights. In the case of Echternach and 
Moritz, for example, it was explicitly stated that a minor who was the son of a worker 
who had in the meantime left the host country ‘retains the right to rely on the provisions 
of Community law’, which allow him to remain in that country to complete [his] studies 
already commenced.” Therefore, “a very young minor like Catherine can be vested with 
rights of movement and residence within the Community.”). 
 79. Zhu, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9951, ¶ 47.  
 80. Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-01449, ¶ 1. 
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of that State acquired by naturalisation [sic] and obtained by deception 
inasmuch as that withdrawal deprives the person concerned of the 
status of citizen of the Union and of the benefit of the rights attaching 
thereto by rendering him stateless.81
Rottmann was born in Austria and at birth acquired Austrian 
nationality.82 However, after the opening of a criminal procedure against 
him in Austria, Rottmann transferred his residence to Germany.83 In 
February 1997, a warrant for Rottmann arrest was issued and in 1998 
Rottmann applied for German nationality.84 However, during his 
naturalization proceedings, Rottmann forgot to mention the proceedings 
against him in Austria.85 Moreover, upon application for the German 
nationality, under Austrian law, Rottmann lost his Austrian nationality.86
After becoming aware of the circumstances, the Freistaat Bayern 
“withdrew the naturalisation [sic] with retroactive effect,” as a result of 
Rottmann trying to obtain German nationality through deception.87
The European Court of Justice began by stating that when examining 
a decision to withdraw naturalization it is necessary to take into account 
the consequences the decision may have for the person concerned and, if 
relevant, for members of his family with regards to rights enjoyed by 
every citizen in the Union.88 Moreover, the Court held that it would not 
be contrary to European Union Law for a Member State to withdraw 
from a “citizen of the Union the nationality of that state acquired by 
naturalization [sic] when the nationality has been obtained by deception, 
on condition that the decision to withdraw observes the principle of 
proportionality” allowing “the  person concerned to be afforded a 
reasonable period of time in to try to recover the nationality of his 
Member State of origin.”89
 81. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. 
 82. Id. ¶ 22. 
 83. Id. ¶ 23. 
 84. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 
 85. Id. ¶ 25. 
 86. Id. ¶ 26. 
 87. Id. ¶ 28. 
 88. Id. ¶ 56. 
 89. Id. ¶ 58–59. 
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C. Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi  
Zambrano is a seminal case, which like Chen, relied upon Article 20 
TFEU to grant a derived right of residence to third-country nationals on 
the basis of their children’s citizenship rights. The preliminary reference 
was made in the context of proceedings between Mr. Zambrano, a 
Colombian national, and the Office national de l’emploi, concerning the 
refusal of the Office national de l’emploi to grant Zambrano 
unemployment benefits under Belgian legislation.90 In 1999, Mr. 
Zambrano, a Colombian national applied for asylum in Belgium and in 
2000 so did his wife.91 However, the applications were refused in 
September 2000, and Belgian authorities ordered the Zambrano’s to 
leave Belgium.92 The order stated that the Zambranos should not be sent 
back to Colombia, as a result of the civil war that was going on in 
Colombia at the time.93 Mr. Zambrano once again applied to have his 
situation regularized on October 2000 however his application was 
refused in August 2001.94 Although he did not have a work permit, Mr. 
Zambrano began working with Plastoria company.95
On September 2003, Mrs. Zambrano gave birth to a second child, 
Diego, who acquired Belgian nationality under Article 10(1) of the 
Belgian Nationality code which stated that “[a]ny child born in Belgium 
who, at any time before reaching the age of 18 or being declared of full 
age, would be stateless if he or she did not have Belgian nationality, shall 
be Belgian.”96 In the present situation, Diego would have been stateless 
had Belgium not had this provision, since “Columbian law does not 
recognize Colombian nationality for children born outside the territory of 
Columbia where the parents do not take specific steps to have them 
 90. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-1235, ¶ 2.  
 91. Id. ¶ 14. 
 92. Id. ¶ 15. 
 93. Id..
 94. Id. ¶ 17.  
 95. Id. ¶ 18. Sharpston was of the opinion that the right to move and to reside 
freely under Art. 20(1) TFEU ought to be interpreted as creating a free-standing right to 
reside irrespective of prior exercise of free movement rights. See Opinion of Advocate 
General, Case C-34/09, Zambrano v Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2010 E.C.R. I-1208, ¶¶ 
100–02.
 96. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-1235, ¶ 4.  
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recognized.”97 In 2004, the Zambranos applied to have their situation 
regularized, putting forward the birth of their second child and relying on 
an “Article 3 of Protocol 4 to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” which “prevents that 
child from being required to leave the territory of the State of which he is 
a national.”98 Once again, after the birth of their third child Jessica in 
2005, the Zambrano’s lodged an application to take up residency in 
Belgium.99 In September 2005, a registration certificate was issued to 
them providing them with residence until February 2006.100 Moreover, in 
2007, Mr. Zambrano brought an action for annulment.101
The European Court of Justice began by stating that Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2004/38 applies to all “Union citizens who move to reside in a 
Member State other than that of which they are a national.”102 Moreover, 
Article 20 confers the status of EU citizen to every person holding a 
nationality of a Member State, such as Diego and Jessica.103 Since 
citizenship of the Union is intended to be “the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States,” then Article 20 TFEU precludes 
national measures, which would deprive citizens of the Union of the 
“genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union.”104 Denying the Zambranos, whose 
two children are Belgian nationals, the right of residence would most 
likely lead to a situation where the children, citizens of the Union, would 
have to leave the Union in order to accompany their parents.105
Therefore, the Court held that denying the right of residence to the 
Zambranos would “deprive [the] children of the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union 
Citizenship.”106 The brevity of the Courts judgment in this case led to 
uncertainty. More specifically, the court did not provide criteria to help 
 97. Id. ¶ 19.  
 98. Id. ¶ 21. 
 99. Id. ¶ 22.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. ¶ 30.  
 102. Id. ¶ 39.  
 103. Id. ¶ 40. 
 104. Id. ¶ 42. 
 105. Id. ¶ 44. 
 106. Id. ¶ 46. 
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determine what constituted deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of a European Union citizens’ right. 
D. Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
While Zambrano broadened the scope of Article 20 TFEU, McCarthy 
narrowed the test set out in Zambrano on the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of European Union citizen rights. In McCarthy v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, Mrs. McCarthy, a British and Irish 
national, who has only lived in the United Kingdom, tried to obtain the 
right to reside in the United Kingdom for her and her Jamaican husband 
under her rights as a Union citizen and Irish national.107 In 2002, after her 
marriage, Mrs. McCarthy applied for an Irish passport for the first 
time.108 In 2004, Mrs. McCarthy and her husband applied to the 
Secretary of State for a residence permit and residence document under 
European Union law, a Union citizen and the spouse of said citizen.109
The Secretary of State for the Home Department refused this application 
because Mrs. McCarthy was not considered a “‘qualified person,’ 
(essentially, a worker, self-employed person or self-sufficient 
person).”110 In turn, Mr. McCarthy could not be considered a spouse of a 
qualified person under Directive 2004/38.111
The Court began by stating that Union citizenship confers on each 
Union citizen a “primary and individual rights to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States.”112 Moreover, Directive 
2004/38 aims to facilitate and strengthen the exercise of the primary and 
individual right to move and reside freely within that territory.113
However, Directive 2004/38 does not apply to a citizen in Mrs. 
McCarthy’s position, who has never exercised her right of free 
movement.114 Regarding whether Article 21 TFEU applies to a Union 
 107. Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, 2010 E.C.R. ¶ 15. 
 108. Id.
 109. Id. ¶ 17. 
 110. Id.
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. ¶ 27. 
 113. Id. ¶ 28. 
 114. Id. ¶ 30. 
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citizen who has never exercised his right of free movement, has always 
resided in the Member State of his/her own nationality, and who is a 
national of another Member State, the Court stated that the rules 
governing freedom of movement under European Union law cannot be 
applied to situations which have no linking factor and which are confined 
to a single Member State.115
However, the fact that Mrs. McCarthy has not exercised her right to 
free movement should not automatically be assumed to be an internal 
matter.116 Moreover, as a national of at least one Member State, Mrs. 
McCarthy enjoys the rights of a Union citizen under Article 20(1) TFEU 
and may rely on the right to move and reside freely within the territory of 
Member States set out in Article 21 TFEU.117 However, the Court found 
that there was no indication that the national measure would deprive Mrs. 
McCarthy of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
derived from her Union citizenship or of her right to move freely within 
Member States, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU.118 Therefore, 
unlike the measure in Zambrano, which had the effect of depriving 
Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights 
conferred upon them, Mrs. McCarthy would not be deprived of such 
rights nor would she be forced to leave the European Union.119
E. Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres 
McCarthy was followed by Dereci. In Dereci v. Bundesministerium 
Fur Inners, the Ministry of Home Affairs rejected applications for 
residence made by Mr. Dereci, Mrs. Heiml, Mr. Kokollari, Mr. Maduike, 
and Mrs. Stevic.120 The question referred to the European Court of 
Justice dealt with whether the provisions concerning citizenship of the 
Union must be interpreted as “precluding a Member State from refusing 
to grant residence within its territory to a third country national,” even 
though the third-country national wants to reside with a family member 
 115. Id. ¶ 45. 
 116. Id. ¶ 46. 
 117. Id. ¶ 48. 
 118. Id. ¶ 49–50.  
 119. Id. ¶ 50.  
 120. Case C-256/11, Dereci v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2011 E.C.R. I-
11315, ¶ 2. 
2017] European Citizenship for Stateless Children 325
who is a European citizen, and a resident in that Member State but who 
has never exercised his right to free movement.121
The European Court of Justice stated that the criteria relating to the 
denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred 
by virtue of European Union citizenship, refers to situations in which the 
Union citizen has to, in fact, “leave not only the territory of the Member 
State of which he is a national but also the territory of the Union as a 
whole,” clarifying the principle set out in Zambrano.122 With respect to 
the concept of private and family life, the Court held that in so far as 
Article 7, concerning respect for private and family life, of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, contains rights guaranteed 
by Article 8(1), these rights are addressed to Member States only when 
they are implementing European Union law.123 Therefore, if the issue is 
covered by European Union law, it must be examined whether the refusal 
of the right of residence undermines Article 7 of the Charter, the right to 
respect for private and family life and if not, then the court must make 
the examination in light of Article 8(1).124 Finally, the Court held that a 
Member State is not precluded from “refusing to allow a third county 
national to reside on its territory, where th[e] third country national 
wishes to reside with a member of his family,” where the “citizen of the 
Union residing in the Member State of which he” is a national “has never 
exercised his right to freedom of movement.”125 However, the refusal 
shall not lead, for the Union citizen concerned, to the denial of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
his status as a citizen of the Union.126
Finally, the case law demonstrates that “citizenship rights Under 20 
and 21 TFEU are only engaged where (i) there is a cross-border element” 
. . . or where “(ii) a national measure would have the effect of” denying a 
national of a Member State “the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
 121. Id. ¶ 37. 
 122. Id. ¶ 66. 
 123. Id. ¶ 72. 
 124. Id.
 125. Id. ¶ 102. 
 126. Id. ¶ 74. 
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the rights conferred by virtue of E[uropean] U[nion] citizen[ship].”127
The “rights conferred by virtue of European Union citizen status does not 
include Charter rights as freestanding rights” in the absence of any 
connection with European Union law.128 Wholly internal situations 
continue to fall within the purview of the Member States and remain 
outside the scope of European Union law.129 Additionally, the European 
Court of Justice reiterated the fact that “Union citizens, who have never 
exercised free movement rights, cannot for that reason alone be 
assimilated to a purely internal situation.”130 “This is because citizenship 
of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of 
Member States[] and thus they may rely on rights pertaining to that 
status, including those exercised against their Member States.”131 But 
should it? Could the principle of European citizenship be expanded to 
include children who would otherwise become stateless under current 
Member State laws?132 In her Zambrano Opinion, Advocate General 
Sharpston “welcomed a new era where the EU citizenship’s philosophy 
would have the ability to reverse the relationship between the refugee 
(third-country national) and the citizen.”133 Therefore, expanding the 
notion of European Union citizenship to include refugees, making the 
“concept of citizenship inclusive rather than exclusive,” in order to help 
 127. Richards, supra note 46, at 284. 
 128. Id.
 129. Id. 
 130. Dereci, 2011 E.C.R. I-11315, ¶ 161. 
 131. Morano-Foadi, supra note 52, at 312. 
132. Id. at 316 (quoting Case C-86/12 Alokpa and Others v Ministre du Travail, de 
l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, 2013 E.C.R. I-000, ¶ 36, where the Court reiterated the 
Zambrano test but concluded that “Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU must be interpreted 
as meaning that they do not preclude a Member State from refusing to allow a third-
country national to reside in its territory, where that third-country national has sole 
responsibility for her minor children who are citizens of the European Union, and who 
have resided with her in that Member State since their birth, without possessing the 
nationality of that Member State and making use of their right to freedom of movement, 
in so far as those Union citizens do not satisfy the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38 
or such a refusal does not deprive those citizens of effective enjoyment of the substance 
of the rights conferred by virtue of the status of European Union citizenship, a matter 
which is to be determined by the referring court.” 
 133. Id. at 317.  
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prevent social exclusion and achieve further integration in the European 
Union.134
PART III: SHOULD THE CONCEPT OF EU CITIZENSHIP BE EXPANDED TO 
INCLUDE STATELESS CHILDREN?
A stateless person is someone who is not considered a national by any 
state because of the law of the state (de jure statelessness) or due to an 
inability to prove identity (de facto statelessness).135 The concept of 
statelessness and nationality are two sides of the same coin. Someone 
who does not possess a nationality is stateless and statelessness can only 
be eliminated through acquisition of a nationality. While there are 
several international instruments that address the issue of statelessness 
including: the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the 
1997 European Convention on Nationality, and the 2006 Council of 
Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to 
State Succession, statelessness still remains a serious problem, 
particularly among children.136 Signatories of these conventions “are 
urged to provide ‘facilitated access to nationality’” in order to prevent 
statelessness; however, not all states provide such protection.137
Statelessness is increasingly recognized as one of Europe’s major 
human rights issues, and over 400,000 stateless persons are estimated to 
be living in the European Union.138 For example, there are an estimated 
13,000 stateless persons living in Germany, 1,100 in France, 2,000 in the 
 134. Id. at 318.  
 135. Matilda Månsson, Reduction of Statelessness & Access to Nationality – The 
Need for EU Regulation – The Showcase of Stateless Roma in Slovenia, at 4  (2013) 
(unpublished Graduate Thesis, Lund University) (on file with author). 
 136. Id.
 137. Id. at 1. 
 138. ENS Submission to the European Commission Consultation on the Future of 
Home Affairs Policies: An Open and Safe Europe – What’s Next?, EUR. NETWORK ON 
STATELESSNESS, http://www.statelessness.eu/law-policy/briefings/ens-submission-
european-commission-consultation-future-home-affairs-policies (last visited Nov. 12, 
2016) [hereinafter, ENS Submission]. 
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Netherlands, and 9,000 in Sweden.139 Addressing statelessness at the 
European Union level is crucial in order to prevent children from 
entering into a state of limbo upon birth. Additionally, it is estimated that 
half of the world’s stateless individuals are children, many of whom 
became stateless at birth.140 This stands at odds with the international 
norms, which explicitly provide for a child’s right to acquire a 
nationality.141
Under European Union law, possession of nationality is a prerequisite 
for European Union citizenship.142 Acquisition of nationality is not based 
on a common European Union policy but is dependent on the nationality 
laws of the Member States.143 Current case law does not provide for the 
protection of children who would be considered “stateless” upon birth.144
Regarding European Union citizenship rights, the European Court of 
Justice has held that a situation cannot be made purely internal just 
because a national of a Member State, who was born in the host Member 
State, has not made use of the right to freedom of movement.145 The 
Court has also stated that Member States are not allowed to impose 
additional conditions for recognition of the nationality granted by 
another Member State.146 The Court has found that a young minor who is 
a national of a Member State, “is covered by appropriate sickness 
insurance and is in the care of a parent who is a third-country national 
having sufficient resources for that minor not to become a burden on the 
public finances of the host Member State, a right to reside for an 
indefinite period in that State.”147 Moreover, Article 18 TFEU and 
 139. Proposal for an EU Directive on the identification of Statelessness and the 
Protection of Stateless Persons from Meijers Committee to Cecilia Malmstrte, 
Commissioner for Home Affairs (Oct. 13, 2014) (on file with Committee). 
 140. Jessica Parra, Stateless Roma in the European Union: Reconciling the 
Doctrine of Sovereignty Concerning Nationality Laws with International Agreements to 
Reduce and Avoid Statelessness, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1666, 1675 (2011). 
 141. Id. at 1675. 
 142. Picard, supra note 8, at 73. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.
 145. Zhu, 2004 E.C.R. I-09925, ¶ 19. 
 146. Id. ¶ 39.  
 147. Id. ¶ 47; see also Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-200/02, Zhu, 2004 
E.C.R. I-09925, which states “[T]here is no doubt that minors can be vested with 
residence rights. In the case of Echternach and Moritz, for example, it was explicitly 
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Council Directive 9-/364/EEC “allows a parent who is that minor’s 
primary [care provider] to reside with the child in the host Member 
State.”148 The Court has also found that when examining a decision to 
withdraw naturalization, it is necessary to take into account the 
consequences the decision may have for the person concerned and, if 
relevant, for members of his family with regards to rights enjoyed by 
every citizen in the Union.149
Since citizenship of the Union is intended to be “the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States,” then Article 20 TFEU 
precludes national measures, which would deprive the citizens of the 
“genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union.150 Moreover, Union citizenship 
confers on each Union citizen a  “primary and individual right[] to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.”151 Finally, 
the Court has stated that the rules governing freedom of movement under 
European Union law cannot be applied to situations which have no 
linking factor and which are confined to a single Member State.152
However, can the notion of European Union citizenship be expanded 
to include children who would otherwise become stateless upon birth in 
certain Member States? In Chen, Mrs. Chen gave birth to her second 
child in Ireland.153 Mrs. Chen and her husband had picked Ireland 
because of a provision in Ireland’s law at the time, which granted 
nationality rights to children born in Ireland who would become stateless 
upon birth. As a result of China’s “one child policy,” that is exactly what 
would have happened to Mrs. Chen’s daughter Catherine had Ireland not 
provided children in such a position with nationality.154 Now, imagine 
stated that a minor who was the son of worker who had in the meantime left the host 
country ‘retains the right to rely on the provisions of Community law’, which allow him 
to remain in that country to complete his studies already commenced.” Therefore, “a very 
young minor like Catherine can be vested with rights of movement and residence within 
the Community.” 
 148. Zhu, 2004 E.C.R. I-09925, ¶ 47. 
 149. Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. I-01449, ¶ 56. 
 150. Zambrano, 2011  I-01177, ¶ 42. 
 151. Id. ¶ 35(2).  
 152. Id. ¶ 39. 
 153. Zhu, 2004 E.C.R. I-09925, ¶ 8–10. 
 154. Ireland eventually changed its law in order to prevent similar situations from 
occurring. 
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that Mrs. Chen and Mr. Chen had not selected Ireland because of its law 
and that Ireland did not provide nationality to children who would 
otherwise be stateless. In this hypothetical, imagine that Mrs. Chen was 
just visiting Ireland and happened to give birth early. In such a situation, 
as happens on a daily basis all over the world, the child would be 
deprived of a nationality and of an identity. Catherine would not be able 
to claim Chinese citizenship or any other citizenship for that matter. A 
similar situation would have happened to Mr. and Mrs. Zambrano’s 
children had Belgium not provided for a similar protection, as did Ireland 
at the time of the birth of their two children. Not only would the 
deprivation of nationality have left the children without citizenship of a 
country but it would have also left them in legal limbo.  
Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union states that  
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.155
Therefore, the European Union has an ethical obligation to protect the 
innocent children and provide them with an identity. A solution to the 
problem of stateless children in the European Union could be to 
eliminate the derivative nature of European Union citizenship by 
allowing individuals to become European Union citizens without the 
prerequisite of a Member State nationality. This would allow children, 
who would otherwise become stateless under the Member State’s law, to 
obtain European Union citizenship and the benefits attached to it.156 The 
European Union could harmonize the rules on the granting of nationality 
based on international agreements for the reduction and prevention of 
statelessness.  
Given the European Union’s interest in the protection of children’s 
rights in its external action and the fact that addressing childhood “would 
go a long way to contributing to ultimately eradicating statelessness, 
 155. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 32, art. 1a.  
 156. Parra, supra note 140, at 1687.  
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promoting children’s right to a nationality can be put forward as another 
priority area of European Union engagement.157 The harmonization of 
nationality laws concerning children born to third-country nationals in 
Member States, who do not have recourse to their own parent’s 
citizenship, will help reduce statelessness. While some may argue that 
Member States should be the ones to address statelessness, 
harmonization can help prevent inequality and can set a standard that all 
Member States must meet.  
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty specifically addresses the legal position 
of stateless persons and could serve as the basis for setting common 
criteria for a statelessness directive, regulation, or procedure. Under 
Article 67(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
the Union  
shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and 
shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external 
border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is 
fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose of this Title, 
stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals.158
Additionally, legislation based on Title V of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union applies equally to stateless 
persons.159 Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union legislator is given the 
authority to develop conditions of residence for third-country nationals 
and stateless persons (Article 79(1) TFEU) and Article 79(2)(a) provides 
the legal basis for defining the conditions of entry and residence of 
stateless persons.160 Article 79 can serve as the legal basis for setting 
common criteria for statelessness determination procedure in 
combination with Article 67(2).161
 157. Addressing the Human Rights Impact of Statelessness in the EU’S External 
Action, supra note 4, at 36.  
 158. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 32, at art. 61(2). 
 159. Månsson, supra note 135, at 5. 
 160. Id. at 6.  
 161. Id. at 6; for other directives adopted on the basis of Article 79 TFEU, see 
generally Council Directive 2004/114, 2005 O.J. (L 375) (EC) (for students); Council 
Directive 2003/86, 2003 O.J. (L 251) (EC) (for family reunification); and Council 
Directive 2003/109, 2004 O.J. (L 16) (EC) Concerning the Status of Third-Country 
Nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents,.  
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Finally, in the Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt stated that 
“[t]o be stripped of worldliness; it is like returning to a wilderness as 
cavemen or savages . . . A man who is nothing but a man has lost the 
very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a 
fellow man . . . they can live and die without leaving any trace, without 
having contributed anything to the common world.”162 No child should 
be placed in this position. Currently, Member States are free to restrict 
the right of nationality upon birth. If laws were based solely on the basis 
of descent of the parents, children born to stateless parents would not be 
able to acquire nationality. There should be no stateless children in 
Europe. It is important to emphasize that the fulfillment of the right of 
acquiring a nationality does not require Member States to grant 
nationality to every child born on their territory, but rather, ensure that 
every child has a right to acquire a nationality, in order to avoid 
statelessness. 
CONCLUSION 
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty came the notion of 
“European citizenship,” which the European Court of Justice claimed 
was to be the “fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the 
same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such 
exception as are expressly provided for.”163 The treaty also 
“communautaried” migration issues and gave European Union 
institutions the competence to define “conditions of entry and residence, 
including long-term residence permits, and the rights and conditions 
under which nationals of third countries,” who were legal residents in 
one Member State could reside in another Member State.164 As the 
principle of European Union citizenship has continued to evolve, some 
have argued that the prerequisite of needing to be a national of a member 
state in order to obtain European Union citizenship rights should be 
 162. ENS Submission, supra note 138, at 5 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, THE 
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951)).  
 163. Grzelczyk, 2001 E.C.R. I-06299, ¶-0629see also BARNARD, supra note 15, at 
437.
 164. Picard, supra note 8, at 74.  
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eliminated in turn, expanding the individuals who could fall under the 
scope of this principle. Among those who deserve protection are the 
children who are being born in Member States and who become stateless 
upon entering the world, as a result of neither parent being a resident or 
citizen of that country or because the country does not grant nationality 
to stateless people. The European Union has an ethical duty to protect 
these children, whether by compelling Member States to adapt their law 
in order to provide children in such a situation with citizenship, or by 
expanding the notion of European Union citizenship to include such 
children. If necessary, the child’s parent should obtain residency rights in 
order to protect the child’s “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.”165
 165. Zambrano, 2011 E.C.R. I-01177, ¶ 42. 
